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The Constitutional Right to a Jury Under Blakely v.
Washington: Can North Carolina Defendants Waive Their
State Right?
In June of 2004, the United States Supreme Court handed down
a new interpretation of the Sixth Amendment1 that came as a shock
to criminal justice systems in many states.2 In Blakely v. Washington,3
the Supreme Court purported to merely reinforce the existing
constitutional precedent of Apprendi v. New Jersey4 on the role of
juries in modern criminal proceedings.' However, the Blakely Court's
clarification-or expansion-of the Apprendi rule meant that North
Carolina and at least twelve other states6 would have to eliminate
their practices of allowing judges to adjust sentences without a jury
One significant
trial on additional facts alleged at sentencing.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ").
2. See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington
PracticalImplications for State Sentencing Systems, POL'Y & PRAC. REV., Aug. 2004, at 13, at http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/242-456.pdf (claiming that the Blakely decision
"roiled many states' criminal justice systems") (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see also Benjamin Niolet, Judges' Sentencing Latitude Restricted, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Sept. 9, 2004, at 1A (describing the impact of the application of
the Blakely rule to North Carolina sentencing laws as "sen[ding] legal experts in both state
and federal courts into a tizzy as they tried to cope with the ramifications").
3. 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Throughout the remainder of this Recent
Development, the Supreme Court Reporter is used for citations to Blakely v. Washington
because pinpoint citations to the United States Reports were unavailable at the time of
publication.
4. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that a twelve-year sentence based on a judicial
finding that the defendant committed a "hate crime" unconstitutional where the statutory
range for the defendant's convicted offense was five to ten years).
5. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (asserting that "[t]his case requires us to apply the rule
we expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey" (citation omitted)).
6. See Wool & Stemen, supra note 2, at 1-2 (explaining why Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee were "fundamentally affected" by Blakely and
listing eight other states whose courts will have to determine the effect of Blakely on
sentencing laws).
7. Under the structured sentencing guidelines of many states, including North
Carolina, a conviction qualifies a defendant for the presumptive, or standard, sentence
range within a larger grid that is divided based on the class of the offense and the
defendant's prior record. See MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A1340.13-17 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.080, .090 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-202
(2003); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.510, .530, .533, .535 (2003); see also IRVING JOYNER,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA § 12.8 (2d ed. 1999); Wool & Stemen,
supra note 2, at 2 (defining "presumptive" and "determinate" sentencing as used in state
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qualification to the rule of jury factfinding in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion came in dicta that "nothing prevents a defendant from
waiving his Apprendi rights."'8 The Court suggested that defendants
could opt for judicial factfinding at sentencing, but North Carolina
and other affected states will have to determine whether state laws
can support the waiver of a jury trial right.9
The Blakely majority based much of its reasoning about the
scope of the jury trial right on the original intent of the Framers of the
As
Federal Constitution and the historical role of juries. 10
policymakers in North Carolina adjust sentencing laws to conform to
the Blakely Court's expansive view of a jury trial, they must consider
whether the state's constitutional and legal histories compel a similar
expansion of the state right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the state
must determine whether anything in North Carolina's constitution
prohibits a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights.
This Recent Development will argue that in spite of Blakely's
acceptance of waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
North Carolina should prohibit waivers of jury factfinding at
sentencing in order to uphold the state's constitutional tradition. This
paper will compare the proper scopes of the state and federal rights to
a jury trial by examining historical differences between the North
Carolina and United States Constitutions. It will also consider the

criminal justice systems). The appropriate class of offense also contains aggravated and
mitigated ranges, and a judge may depart into these ranges if he finds, by a preponderance
of evidence, that statutory sentencing factors justify the departure. See JOYNER, supra.
Before Apprendi, some states allowed a judge to sentence above the aggravated range,
whereby the prison term for a second-degree kidnapping conviction might be just as long
as a standard sentence for first-degree kidnapping. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e)
(West 1995) (allowing extended imprisonment where the judge finds that the defendant
committed a hate crime). Since Apprendi, states have forbidden judges to sentence above
the aggravated range based on their own findings of aggravating facts. See, e.g., State v.
Johnson, 766 A.2d 1126, 1138 (N.J. 2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stanton,
820 A.2d 637, 646 (N.J. 2003); State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 597-98, 548 S.E.2d 712, 731

(2001).
8. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2541.

9. While the United States Supreme Court has ultimate authority over the
interpretation of the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has the power to interpret the state constitutional right to a jury
trial differently than the federal right.

See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41

(1983) (holding that state supreme courts have ultimate authority over their constitutions);
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 713, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1988) ("Even were the two

provisions identical, we have the authority to construe our own constitution differently
from the construction by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Constitution, as
long as our citizens are thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are guaranteed by the
parallel federal provision.").
10. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538-39.
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implications of North Carolina's history of prohibiting waivers of the
state right to a jury trial. This Recent Development will conclude
that North Carolina must treat sentencing hearings as an essential
part of the non-waivable right to a criminal jury trial. Accordingly,
the state must require jury determinations of all disputed facts used to
support an aggravated sentence.
In Blakely, the Court held that a statute within Washington
State's structured sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment by giving judges the discretion to enhance sentences
based on aggravating facts not tried to a jury. I" Having pled guilty to
second-degree kidnapping, the defendant qualified for a standard
sentence range of forty-nine to fifty-three months, according to the
statutory guidelines.'2 However, after hearing the victim's emotional
testimony at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found that the
defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty," an aggravating factor
under Washington sentencing statutes. 3 Thus, the judge departed
from the standard sentence range and imposed an exceptional
sentence of ninety months. The sentence fell below the statutory
maximum sentence of ten years for that class of felony but exceeded
14
the standard sentence by thirty-seven months.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion relied on the Apprendi holding
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."15 Justice Scalia explained that "the 'statutory maximum' for
11. Id. at 2538.
12. Id. at 2535.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). The New
Jersey statute held unconstitutional in Apprendi allowed the judge to consider evidence
and find, by a mere preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed a "hate
crime." See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491. Likewise, prior to the "Blakely Act," North
Carolina's aggravated sentencing statute provided a preponderance of evidence standard
for judicial consideration of aggravating facts. N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a) (2003).
See infra text accompanying note 28 (explaining the evolution of the "Blakely Act,"
legislation amending state law to conform to the Blakely decision).
This rule also requires the prosecution to allege all facts relevant to the elements
and to sentencing in the indictment so that a defendant may either plead guilty to all facts
that affect his punishment, go to trial, or plead guilty to the essential elements but agree to
a bench trial on the sentencing facts. See Memorandum from Professor Robert L. Farb,
University of North Carolina Institute of Government, Blakely v. Washington and Its
Impact
on
North
Carolina's
Sentencing
Laws
11,
at
http://ncinfo.iog.unc.edu/programs/crimlaw/faculty.htm (expressing some doubt as to
whether the defendant could waive his right to a jury at sentencing in North Carolina)
(July 9, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.1 6 The Court's concern with surpassing statutory
maximums derived from an understanding of common law principles
that no person may be punished for a crime unless a jury has found
facts to support each essential element of that crime.17 Because
modern structured sentencing laws list factors necessary or essential
to support "aggravated sentences," Justice Scalia suggested that such
factors and enhancements should be treated as additional crimes and
punishment. 8 In his view, aggravating facts must be tried to the jury
to maintain the constitutional intent. 9 The Court thus held that if
states choose to set mandatory or "presumptive" sentencing ranges
for criminal offenses, state court judges may not determine the
existence of aggravated sentencing elements unless the defendant
waives his right to a jury trial at the guilt or sentencing phases.20
In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that some states may disallow
waivers of the right to a jury at sentencing. 21 He argued that under
the majority's new rule, such states may force defendants to choose
between two inadequate options of either pleading guilty to all
elements of the crime and punishment, "or proceed[ing] with a (likely
prejudicial) trial on all ...elements. '22 Justice Breyer expressed the
fear that these no-waiver states will not give defendants the option of
having a jury trial for the conviction phase and, in the event of a
guilty verdict, will ask a judge to determine the aggravating factors.23
Blakely sent shockwaves through the legal community, forcing
many state courts to rule quickly on the constitutionality of
sentencing statutes.

On September 7, 2004, in State v. Allen,24 the

Court of Appeals of North Carolina found that Blakely applied to a

16. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
17. Id. at 2536-37 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 343 (1769) and 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed.
1872)).
18. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539 nn.10-11 (expressing the fear that legislatures
would allow judges to impose greatly enhanced sentences without relying on jury trials by
labeling a great number of types of behavior as "sentencing factors" rather than additional
"elements" or separate offenses).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 2541.
21. Id. at 2555-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Prior to Blakely, North Carolina did provide this option, but did not allow a jury
trial on the sentencing factors regardless of the defendant's wishes. See JOYNER, supra
note 7, § 12.7.
24. 166 N.C. App. 139, 601 S.E.2d 299 (2004).
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state statute that authorized a judge to depart from the presumptive
range into the aggravated range for an offense based on her own

finding of aggravating facts.2 Thus, North Carolina judges may not
continue to sentence in the aggravated range of the state sentencing
guidelines based on facts that have not been tried to a jury or
admitted, as such practice would violate the Sixth Amendment. 6

Accordingly, the North Carolina General Assembly asked the
state's Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission ("Commission")
to consider options for conforming its sentencing laws to the Blakely
rule. In January of 2005, the Commission returned a proposal for
amending structured sentencing laws to require jury findings on all

facts used to justify an aggravated sentence. 7 In June of 2005, the

General Assembly enacted the Commission's proposed amendments
to the sentencing guidelines for aggravated and mitigated sentences
(the "Blakely Act"). 8

Judges in North Carolina may no longer

impose aggravated sentences on the basis of their own findings of

aggravating factors. 29 The Blakely Act also raises the State's burden
of proof for aggravating factors from a preponderance of the evidence

25. See id. at 149, 602 S.E.2d at 306 (finding the application of North Carolina's
"Aggravated and Mitigated Sentence" statute unconstitutional and "substantially similar
to the portion of Washington's criminal sentencing statute analyzed in Blakely"). North
Carolina's criminal procedure statutes provide three sentencing ranges for each class of
offense: presumptive, mitigated, and aggravated. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16
(2003). Conviction of the essential elements of the crime qualifies the defendant for the
presumptive range. See id. § 15A-1340.17(c)(2).
26. See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
27. See Sentencing Commission, Blakely Subcommittee Draft Legislation, Second
Draft of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16 (Dec. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Draft Legislation] (leaving
intact the bulk of the structured sentencing act). The reasons why the Commission chose
to require jury factfinding rather than broaden presumptive sentence ranges to allow
judicial discretion to adjust sentences without surpassing the "statutory maximum" are
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. However, it is interesting to note that the
decision to maintain narrow sentencing ranges (if accepted by the General Assembly) will
protect the state's capacity to predict and control the use of limited prison space. See
generally Ronald F. Wright, Managing Prison Growth in North Carolina Through
Structured Sentencing, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: PROGRAM Focus (U.S. Dept.
of Justice) (Feb. 1998) (describing the massive problem of prison shortages that
threatened North Carolina's criminal justice system in the 1980s and early 1990s, and
praising the state's response of enacting mandatory, tightly-structured sentencing
guidelines and developing a computer software system to estimate future sentences under
the Structured Sentencing Act of 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
28. See 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 145 (naming the act "An Act to Amend State Law
Regarding the Determination of Aggravating Factors in a Criminal Case to Conform with
the United States Supreme Court Decision in Blakely v. Washington").
29. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(al) (2005).
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to beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Blakely decision."
However, unlike the Supreme Court opinion in Blakely, neither the
court in State v. Allen nor the Commission addressed waivers. Thus,
the Blakely Act does not specifically grant or deny the right to waive

a jury trial on aggravating factors in favor of judicial factfinding at the
sentencing phase. 31 Allowing waivers of the right to a jury trial may
appear to offer an attractive means of reducing the fiscal and
administrative impact of complying with Blakely's general holding.
However, aspects of the North Carolina Constitution weigh heavily
against the use of waivers in the manner suggested by the Blakely
Court 32
.
Prior to Blakely, North Carolina understood the right to a jury
trial to guarantee a jury finding on the essential elements of the crime
charged,33 but not on sentencing factors.' 4 In State v. Denning,35 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that:

30. Id. § 15A-1340.16(a).
31. See id. § 15A-1340.16(a3). Two other components of the amendments to North
Carolina's procedure for structured sentencing raise interesting issues about the
relationship between the State and the individual defendants. First, the Blakely Act
allows defendants to admit to aggravating factors, meaning that neither judges nor juries
will determine the truth of the alleged facts that are necessary to support enhanced
sentences. Id. § 15A-1340.16(al). Second, the Blakely Act gives judges the option-based
on "the interests of justice"-to bifurcate trials so that separate juries hear the facts
supporting convictions of offenses and those facts supporting aggravated sentences. Id.
§ 15A-1340.16(al). Whether bifurcated trials and the right to admit aggravating factors
enhance or diminish the state's protection of individual rights were not discussed by the
Blakely Court and are beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
32. Some practitioners do not believe that the conflict in constitutional law
surrounding waivers will seriously affect North Carolina's response to Blakely because, as
a practical matter, courts will allow waivers at the sentencing phase in order to facilitate
speedier trials. See Telephone Interview with Bruce Lillie, Assistant District Attorney,
Charlotte, N.C. (Sept. 3, 2004). But see Telephone Interview with Lyle Yurko, Attorney,
Yurko & Owens, P.A. (Sept. 1, 2004) (agreeing that the waiver issue must be addressed in
light of Blakely). Because the Sentencing Commission has recognized the need to address
the state constitutional issues surrounding the use of waivers, this Recent Development
will seek to provide some guidance. See generally Professor Jim Drennan, Address at the
North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission Meeting (Sept. 10, 2004)
(posing similar options to the Sentence Commission) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
33. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 274 N.C. 438,442,164 S.E.2d 177, 180 (1968) ("Defendant
was entitled as of right to a jury trial as to every essential element of the crime charged,
including the question as to his identity.").
34. See State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 674, 249 S.E.2d 709, 722 (1978) (excluding
mitigating factors from the scope of the right to a jury trial); State v. Field, 75 N.C. App.
647, 648, 331 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1985) (distinguishing elements of a driving-while-impaired
offense from statutory sentencing factors for federal and state constitutional purposes).
35. 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d 855 (1986).
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[B]ecause the factors before the trial judge in determining
sentencing are not elements of the offense, their consideration
for purposes of sentencing is a function of the judge and
therefore not susceptible to constitutional challenge based upon
either the sixth amendment right to a jury trial or article I,
section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution.36
Though Apprendi held that judicial findings of aggravated facts
which enable a sentence above the statutory maximum do violate the
Sixth Amendment, the North Carolina courts did not initially read
Apprendi to invalidate Denning and the practice of judicial finding of
sentencing facts altogether.37 Because Blakely expanded the scope of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under structured sentencing
schemes to include sentencing factors,38 Denning's analysis of this
right cannot stand.
The United States Supreme Court has
determined that if the state legislature established maximum
punishments for criminal convictions, the imposition of any sentence
above the statutory limit must be prefaced by the (waivable) right to a
jury trial.3 9 Now, North Carolina must decide whether the right to a
jury trial under Article I, Section 24 of the state constitution should
also include sentencing factors. 4'
Having purported to accept
Apprendi's expansion of the right to a jury trial in State v. Lucas,4' the
state courts will need a strong argument for rejecting Blakely's
clarification of Apprendi. If North Carolina does find that the scope
of the state constitutional right should be as broad as its federal
counterpart, the state's longstanding prohibition on waivers of the
right to a jury trial would prevent defendants from electing to have a
judge find any aggravating facts. 42 The state may consider reversing
constitutional precedent, but if the state cannot justify such a reversal,

36. Id. at 524, 342 S.E.2d at 856.
37. See State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 596, 548 S.E.2d 712, 731 (2001) (finding the
statutory maximum for a criminal offense in North Carolina to be the highest possible
sentence from within the range presented by the chart in section 15A-1340.17(e) of the
state sentencing statute).
38. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004).
39. See id.
40. When the Allen court recognized that the defendant's aggravated sentence based
on judicial factfinding violated the Sixth Amendment, it did not consider whether such
factfinding would violate the parallel right in the state constitution. See State v. Allen, 166
N.C. App. 139, 147-50, 601 S.E.2d 299, 305-06 (2004) (finding that the defendant's
aggravated sentence based on judicial factfinding violated the Sixth Amendment).
41. 353 N.C. at 597,548 S.E.2d at 731 (following Apprendi).
42. See State v. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. 33, 41, 454 S.E.2d 271, 276 (1995); see also
infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibition of waivers of the state
constitutional right to jury trial in criminal cases).
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even in light of a broadening view of the scope of the federal right,
then state courts must begin holding jury trials on all alleged
aggravating factors.
To be sure, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has the
authority to reject Blakely's definition of the right to a jury trial as it
applies to Article I, Section 24,41 but the distinction between the
similar federal and state constitutional provisions ought to rest on
solid reasoning and legitimate interpretive methods.' Consideration
of the text and intent of the framers of each constitution must be part
of the evaluation.
The text of Article I, Section 24 provides that "[n]o person shall
be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in
open court. ' 45 On one hand, the word "convicted" suggests that
factors not affecting the statutory elements of the crime need not fall
within the constitutional guarantee.46 However, this language must be
read in historical context. The Blakely opinion provides useful insight
into the origins of the American right to a jury trial. Though the
Federal Constitution does not contain the limiting word "conviction,"
Justice Scalia prompted a Supreme Court debate over the history of
sentencing and conviction phases by focusing on common law use of
juries.47
As Justice Breyer noted in dissent, in the late eighteenth century
when the constitutions were written, the punishment for most felonies
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
44. See Harry C. Martin, The State as a "Font of Constitutional Liberties": North
CarolinaAccepts the Challenge, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (1992). Justice Martin argued
that:
[W]hen the state court merely parrots the United States Supreme Court in
decisions involving rights guaranteed by the state constitution, it forsakes its duty
to develop a body of state constitutional law necessary to protect the rights of the
people. Such failure would frustrate the very purpose of having a state
constitution.
Id.
45. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.
46. See State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 454, 412 S.E.2d 31, 36 (1992) ("Art. 1, § 24, as
its plain language states, applies to the determination of a defendant's guilt of the crime
charged.").
47. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2558-59 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(making a constitutional distinction between common law elements and factors that judges
traditionally considered when imposing sentences even before the enactment structured
sentencing statutes); id. at 2546, 2548 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (same); id. at 2536 n.5
(dismissing the dissenters' interpretation of common law); see also id. at 2536 (quoting 1 J.
BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872) for the proposition that a
punishment must be based on the truth of accusations relevant to the punishment as well
as to the crime).
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punishments, but in minor, non-capital cases, judges often held the
authority to choose between several forms of punishment. 49 As states

replaced capital punishment with imprisonment for felony
convictions, judicial discretion to vary sentence lengths grew
substantially in most states. 0 Thus, the Blakely dissenters suggest
that the common law right to a jury trial included only the conviction
phase and should not now be extended to include statutory

sentencing factors.
The majority dismissed this argument,5
contending, in part, that the justification would authorize legislatures
to reclassify elements of an offense as sentencing factors under
structured sentencing.5 2 In the Court's view, this shift gives an
unconstitutional degree of discretion to judges.53 Justice Scalia
contended that modern structured sentencing laws are evolving in
ways that take facts which should be "essential to the punishment,"
and thus the realm of the jury, and label them "sentencing factors"
for a judge to consider.5 4 Justice Scalia worries that the logical

conclusion of this legislative trend will be a situation where "a judge
could sentence a man for committing murder even if the jury
convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm used to commit
it-or of making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death
scene."5 5 The Blakely majority thus found that judicial findings of
48. Id. at 2559 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of
Jury Sentencing: Misgivings about Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REV. 621, 628-30 (2003)).
Lillquist explains that imprisonment did not emerge as a significant alternative to capital
punishment in America until the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Lillquist,
supra, at 641-42. But see id. at 640 n.83 (arguing that colonial North Carolina courts
resisted imposing the death penalty based on the fact that the state sentenced only sixtyseven white defendants to death in the entire colonial period).
49. See Lillquist, supra note 48, at 629, 642-43 (finding courts' discretion in
punishment to be generally true in England and the American states).
50. See id. at 642-43 (citing Virginia and Georgia as the only clear exceptions among
the original thirteen colonies). But see id. at 642 n.94 (noting that North Carolina was
much slower than most states to achieve this reform because it did not build a state
penitentiary until after the Civil War).
51. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 n.5.
52. See id. at 2539 (arguing that rejecting Apprendi would allow legislatures to exclude
juries from factors it chose to label as sentencing factors, "no matter how much they may
increase the punishment").
53. See id.
54. Id. at 2539, 2543.
55. Id. at 2539 n.10 (rejecting Justice O'Connor's counterargument that the political
branch would provide a check on such extreme judicial behavior because, as Justice Scalia
sees it, "the many immediate practical advantages of judicial factfinding ...suggest that
political forces would, if anything, pull in the opposite direction," and furthermore, "the
Framers' decision to entrench the jury-trial right in the Constitution shows that they did
not trust government to make political decisions in this area").
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aggravated sentencing facts violated the original intent of the Framers
to ensure the right to a judgment by a jury of one's peers. Justice
Scalia illustrated the Framers' intent by citing their own external
writings56 and other common law authorities on the tremendous
importance of juries.57

Before North Carolina rejects the United States Supreme
Court's definition of the scope of a jury trial for state constitutional
purposes, the state should also consider whether the Supreme Court's
original intent analysis logically applies to the drafters of the state
constitution as well. On one hand, the state constitution's reference
to "convicted" in 1776 when the North Carolina Constitution was
adopted may have meant the determination of which crimes were
committed and thus which punishment should apply. Translated into
modem structured sentencing contexts with multiple punishment
options, "conviction" could include the identification of aggravating
facts of the crime required to depart from the statutory maximum. If
North Carolina courts agree with this analysis of original intent, they
should not tolerate the state legislature's distinctions between
sentencing facts and "essential elements" within the state
constitutional framework. Thus, the state prohibition on waivers of
the right to a jury trial could not be made to apply only to the first
phase of a criminal trial.
On the other hand, if the state finds that the framers did not use
"conviction" to refer to both a finding of guilt and an imposition of
punishment, then the state can continue with its current procedure of
judicial factfinding for aggravated sentences. It can require nonwaivable jury trials under the state constitution for the guilt phase
and then permit criminal defendants to waive their jury trial right
under the United States Constitution at the sentencing phase.
However, this latter course-imposing the Blakely result on
North Carolina courts-would be the wrong choice for two reasons.
First, as discussed in greater detail below, this conclusion would cut
against North Carolina's constitutional tradition of stringently
protecting individual rights. 8 Furthermore, it would create a
confusing legal rule for defendants pleading not-guilty to the essential
56. See id. at 2539 (citing John Adams, Diary Entry (Feb. 12, 1771), reprinted in 2
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 252, 253 (C. Adams ed., 1850) and Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to the Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 282, 283 (J. Boyd ed., 1958)).
57. See id. at 2536 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 343 (1769) and 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)).

58. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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elements of their crime and to an alleged aggravating fact.
Defendants would know that Blakely gives them the freedom to ask
for judicial determinations on the aggravating conduct, but they could
not similarly ask the judge to rule on the truth of the alleged conduct
that supports the base-level conviction.
The differences between the histories and structures of the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions shed light on the
drafters' intent and undercut the logic of narrowly interpreting the
state right to a jury trial in modern criminal procedure. Whereas the
Framers of the United States Constitution added the Bill of Rights
and its provision for jury trials four years after signing the primary
text of the Constitution,59 North Carolina's constitutional drafters set
forth the state's jury trial provision in a declaration of rights which
was passed one day prior to the rest of the North Carolina
Constitution.'
The Supreme Court of North Carolina stated, in
61
Corum v. University of North Carolina,
a case involving freedom of

speech, that the prior passage of the provision for individual rights
manifests "the primacy of the Declaration [of Rights] in the minds of
the framers.

62

Additionally, the Federal Bill of Rights protects only specifically
enumerated rights. 63 In contrast, the state drafters not only
guaranteed specific rights but also included broad principles of selfgovernment and individual rights. 64 In the provision for civil juries,
the state drafters called the jury trial "one of the best Securities of the
Rights of the People .... "65 Thus, state constitutional scholars have

noted that "North Carolina places a higher emphasis on jury trials
than the [federal government]." ' This emphasis favors the state's
59. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKLEMAN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 97 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that the first ten
amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which itself was ratified in 1787, were not ratified
until December 15, 1791).
60. See 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 973-74 (William L.
Saunders ed., Raleigh, Jesphus Daniels, Printer to the State, 1890). Later versions of the
constitution incorporated the rights originally provided in the Declaration into the
primary articles of the current state constitution. See John V. Orth, North Carolina
ConstitutionalHistory, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1795 (1992) (noting the declaration of rights
became Article I in the Constitution of 1791).
61. 330 N.C. 761,413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
62. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289-90.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
64. See, e.g., N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 1 ("That all political Power is
vested in and derived from the People only.").
65. N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 14.

66. E-mail from Harry C. Martin, former justice of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, to author (Sept. 20, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See
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acceptance of Blakely's expansive interpretation of the right to a jury
under structured sentencing schemes as being equally applicable to
Article I, Section 24. Rejecting a broad reading of the state right to a

jury trial contradicts the understanding of the drafters that a jury trial
was one of the best means of securing the rights of the people.67

The historical contexts surrounding the passage of each
document point to overlapping protective intents of the North
Carolina drafters and the federal Framers. For example, the
Declaration of Independence specifically cites the deprivation of jury
trials as one of the grievances against the King.68 The Declaration
likely left powerful impressions on the drafters of both constitutions, 69
not only because it triggered the Revolutionary War but also because

it was signed in the same year as the North Carolina Constitution and
eleven years before the United States Constitution.70 Further
illustrating the commitment of state leaders to jury trials at the time
of the constitutional framing, North Carolina recommended that the
1788 Constitutional Convention add a bill of rights because of the

state leaders' perception that the primary articles of the Constitution
did not sufficiently guarantee individual rights.71

Because North

Carolina's drafters were at least as committed as the Framers to the
revolutionary principles of individual rights, subtracting from the
also Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protectionin Jury Selection? The Implementation
of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1575-76 (1991)
(suggesting that the use of peremptory challenges in North Carolina courts threatens the
"special protections against discrimination in jury selection" offered by the North Carolina
Constitution).
67. See N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 14.
68. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) ("For depriving us
of many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury....").
69. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
9 (2d ed. 2002) ("Although it has no binding legal authority ... [the Declaration of
Independence's] complaints about British rule foreshadowed the protections that were
placed in the Constitution and its Bill of Rights."); JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 3 (1993) ("The declaration of rights and the
constitution (narrowly considered) form an effective blend of revolutionary theory and
practical politics.").
70. U.S. CONST. of 1787; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); N.C.
CONST. of 1776. Professor Orth credits one of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence, North Carolinian William Hooper, as having profoundly influenced the
state constitution, because he sent a letter to the drafting committee that provided
important constitutional models enabling the rapid enactment of the North Carolina
Constitution. See ORTH, supra note 69, at 2.
71. See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
266-76, 290 (1894) (providing documentation of the North Carolina constitutional
convention in 1788 that adopted a resolution that Congress ought to provide a declaration
of rights), availableat http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratnc.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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federal definition of a jury trial for the purposes of state
constitutional interpretation contradicts the drafters' original intent.
In addition to the political and legal setting for the drafting of the
state constitution, early North Carolina cases provide support for
interpreting the scope of the state right to a jury trial in accordance
with that of the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, once constitutional
conventions set up the frameworks for self-government under the
state and federal constitutions, the early American state courts
referred to English common law when interpreting their constitutions
and developing legal principles of fairness and individual rights."
Early North Carolina and United States cases cited the Magna Charta
and Blackstone in decisions regarding the fundamental importance of
the jury.73 As discussed above, the eighteenth century common law
sheds light on the historical tradition of using juries to hear all facts
relevant to the conviction of a crime and imposing punishment.74
Justice Scalia also noted in Blakely that Blackstone's Commentaries
and Bishop's Criminal Procedure, two quintessential common law
compilations, provide powerful evidence that the Framers expected
the jury to provide a check on the power of the judicial branch to take
away individual liberties75 by entrusting the jury to conduct all
7 6 Similarly, State v. Holt,77
factfinding relevant to state punishment.
72. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. 441, 491 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dissenting)
(" 'The common law of England, and every statute of that country made for the benefit of

the subject before our ancestors migrated to this country, were, so far as the same were
applicable to the nature of their situation, and for their benefit, brought over hither by
them'...." (citations omitted)).
73. E.g., State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749, 750 (1884) ("The substance of [Article I, Section
24] is taken from Magna Charta. For centuries the right of trial by jury in criminal cases
has been regarded by the English people as one of their chief and sure defenses against
arbitrary power."); State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883) ("It is a fundamental principle
of the common law, declared in 'Magna Charta,' and again in our Bill of Rights, that 'no
person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and
lawful men in open court.' " (quoting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24)); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54
U.S. 115, 142 (1851) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (quoting Blackstone for his prediction that the
trial by jury will be remembered as the "glory of the English law").
74. See Lillquist, supra note 48, at 628-50; supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
75. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)) (discussing the
requirement that a unanimous verdict be reached by twelve of the defendant's " 'equals
and neighbours' "); id. at 2543 (citing Blackstone as support for the traditional preference
for adversarial testing of facts before a jury rather than judicial inquisition).
76. See id. at 2536 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)) (stating that " 'the truth of every accusation' against a
defendant 'should afterwards be confirmed by the [jury]' "); id. (quoting 1 J. BISHOP,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)) (stating that accusations must contain
all facts relevant to the punishment).
77. 90 N.C. 749 (1884).
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an early North Carolina case on the state constitutional right to a jury
trial, also cites Blackstone on the importance of maintaining the role
of juries.78 Thus, a rejection of Justice Scalia's gloss on the common

law history of jury trials runs contrary to the history of state
constitutional principles.
The second constitutional question North Carolina lawmakers
and courts must consider in light of Blakely is whether the United
States Supreme Court's allowance for waivers of the federal right to a
jury trial on aggravating factors should apply to the parallel state
constitutional right.79 The textual differences between the state and
federal constitutions lend support to a prohibition of jury trial waivers
at the state level in spite of the federal allowance for waivers. In

contrast to the North Carolina Constitution's mandate that "[n]o
person shall be convicted,"8 the language of the United States
Constitution seems to merely offer the right to a jury trial to all who

choose it in their own self-interest.8 ' The Sixth Amendment states
that "[iun all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."82 The Framers'

adoption of the individual defendant's perspective suggests the
Framers' view that if individuals did not consider the right
"enjoyable," they need not exercise it. This analysis supports the

United States Supreme Court's consistent acceptance of waivers of
the right to a jury trial since Patton v. United States.83 In Patton, the

Court found that the absence of a prohibition on waivers gave

78. Id. at 753 (quoting Blackstone at length on the evil of a system lacking justices of
the peace and other representatives of government, regardless of any advantages of
efficiency or convenience that stem from displacing a jury).
79. The Blakely opinion fails to cite any language in the text of the Constitution for
evidence that waivers are permissible. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541. Instead it cites
Duncan v. Louisiana,in which the Court allowed defendants to waive the "fundamental"
federal right to a jury trial based on the Court's understanding that judge-conducted trials
could be administered as fairly as jury trials in some cases. Id. (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)).
80. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 24 (emphasis added).
81. See Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) ("There is nothing in the
Constitution to prevent an accused from choosing to have his fate tried before a judge
without a jury even though, in deciding what is best for himself, he follows the guidance of
his own wisdom and not that of a lawyer.").
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
83. 281 U.S. 276 (1930). Since Patton, the principle of freedom to waive a jury trial
has extended to give defendants the option of a trial presided over by a judge as the trier
of fact. See Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275-81 (1942) (relying on the lack of
anything in the Constitution prohibiting waivers of rights to uphold a defendant's waiver
of a jury trial and the trial court's determination of his guilt).
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individuals the right to waive a twelve-member jury trial.' Most
states likewise permit waivers of the right to a jury trial either by
statute, express constitutional provision, or case law.85

In contrast, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has long
prohibited criminal defendants from waiving the right to a jury trial
based on its reading of the text and original intent of the North
Carolina Constitution.86 In State v. Thompson,87 the Court of Appeals

of North Carolina emphasized that the "defendant possesses an
absolute constitutional right to plead not guilty and be tried before a

jury."" To protect this right, the appellate court declared that the
defendant's desire to plead not guilty and exercise the right to a jury
could not serve as any basis for the trial court's choice of punishment
at sentencing.89 In State v. Camby,9 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina invalidated the negotiation of nolo contendere pleas to

bypass jury trials, stating that "the parties are not permitted to change
the policy of the law and substitute a new method of trial in criminal
prosecutions for that of a trial by jury as guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Nor can this be done by act of assembly."9 1 Thus,

84. See Patton,281 U.S. at 299 (finding there to be no constitutional violation where a
district judge accepts a defendant's waiver of the right to a full twelve-person jury).
85. See Annotation, Waiver, After Not Guilty Plea, of Jury Trial in Felony Case, 9
A.L.R.4th 695, 697, 718-19 (1981) (providing a host of sample state cases and citing
primarily to North Carolina cases for exceptions to the rule, but also noting that State v.
Scalise, 131 Mont. 238, 309 P.2d 1010 (1957), found waivers prohibited under the Montana
Constitution). Looking to the fact that the vast majority of states allow an individual to
waive his right to a jury trial, North Carolina might be tempted to rest its decision on the
widespread acceptance of this practice and the fairness of judge-conducted trials in other
states. However, instead of a blind acceptance of the majority position, a thoughtful
analysis of the state's unique constitutional traditions and views on individual rights would
produce a much more honest and informed decision about this state's jury trial right.
86. See State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 78-80, 185 S.E.2d 189, 192-93 (1971) (ordering a
new trial where defendant waived his right to a full jury and asked that the court proceed
with eleven jurors after one became ill); State v. Camby, 209 N.C. 50, 51-52, 182 S.E.2d
715, 715-16 (1935) (invalidating a statute that allowed defendants to enter a conditional
plea and have the judge consider the evidence and determine guilt); State v. Stewart, 89
N.C. 563, 564 (1883) (finding the right to a jury trial contained in Section 24 of the North
Carolina Constitution to be absolute such that a defendant who pled not guilty could not
waive the right to a trial by jury); State v. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. 33, 41, 454 S.E.2d 271,
276 (1995) (holding that the right to a jury trial cannot be waived by a criminal defendant
who pleads not guilty).
87. 118 N.C. App. 33, 454 S.E.2d 271 (1995).
88. Id. at 41; 454 S.E. 2d at 276.
89. See id. at 41-43, 454 S.E.2d at 276-77 (scrutinizing the impact of the prosecutor's
statements at trial about the defendant "hiding behind the law" by insisting on a jury trial
but concluding that the error was harmless).
90. 209 N.C. 50, 182 S.E. 715 (1935).
91. Id. at 51-52, 182 S.E. at 715-16.
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North Carolina's commitment derives from the state courts'
willingness to protect fundamental constitutional principles of
protecting individual rights. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reasoned in Corum, "[t]he very purpose of the Declaration of Rights
is to ensure that the violation of these rights is never permitted by
anyone who might be invested under the Constitution with the
powers of the State."92
Despite the protective basis of the state's prohibition on waivers,
preventing a defendant from choosing between a judge or jury trial
could constitute a form of oppression or limitation of rights.93
However, the original version of the state constitution illustrates why
the state's insistence on jury trials actually protects individual rights.
The 1776 North Carolina Declaration of Rights asserted that "the
ancient Mode of Trial by jury is one of the best Securities of the
Rights of the People ...

."9

The drafters declared that the right

"ought to remain sacred and inviolable."'
Though this
pronouncement came in the provision for juries in civil cases, it
speaks generally to power relationships between the State and the
people. 96 The drafters' certainty of the fundamental value of jury
trials therefore suggests that the state drafters did not see a need for
the option of waiving a jury trial.97 Allowing a judge to displace the
jury in determining the punishment of a defendant does not square
with the North Carolina drafters' view of the jury as "sacred and
inviolable."
Additionally, the choice of the words "mode of trial by jury,"
rather than the opportunity for such, implies that the drafters
provided a constitutional right to jury trials not only to protect
individuals, but to prevent the gradual increase in government
oppression. This macro view of the value of jury trials deserves credit
92. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761,783,413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992).
93. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2555-56 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the problem with amending criminal offense statutes to include highly
specific sentencing factors is that defendants will be forced to choose between pleading
guilty to all elements of these complex offenses or proceeding "with a (likely prejudicial)
trial" on all elements).
94. N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 14.
95. Id.
96. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74, 379-81 (1769)) (suggesting that, in civil trials, the
facts relating to criminal sentences are better discovered by juries than by judges).
97. For further examination of the common law conception of the jury trial as an
institution needed to uphold self-government, see the reference to juries as a "sacred
bulwark of the nation" in 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 344 (1769).
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because, for example, if citizens, who do not work within the judicial
branch, control the outcome of all criminal cases, prosecutors will
know that political or personal relationships with judges cannot
influence the outcome of trials.98

Thus, prosecutors will be more

careful deciding which defendants to prosecute and assembling their
cases. 99 Demonstrating a similar macro view of individual rights, the
United States Supreme Court observed that
the guarantee [of public grand jury proceedings] has always
been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that

every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power.' °°
While this observation does not speak directly to the issue of waiving

the right to a jury trial, it suggests that enforcement of constitutional
rights ensures the fairness of the criminal justice system as a whole.
Beyond the original intent of the state constitutional drafters
specific to jury trials, constitutional precedent also informs the
understanding of the nature of Article I, Section 24 in several ways.
First, North Carolina case law has praised the state constitution for
better protecting the rights of individuals than even the United States
Constitution. 1 1 Second, in an early state case on the police power,
State v. Harris,"~ the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted that

"[there is a fundamental canon or construction that a Constitution
should receive a liberal interpretation in favor of a citizen .... .103
98. For a similar argument about how zealous advocacy by criminal defense attorneys
for clients they know to be guilty ensures the fairness of the system as a whole, see John B.
Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney - New Answers to Old Questions, 32
STAN. L. REV. 293, 320-21 (1980).
99. Id.
100. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,270 (1948).
101. In Corum v. University of North Carolina,330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992), the
Supreme Court of North Carolina explained that "[o]ur Constitution is more detailed and
specific than the federal Constitution in the protection of the rights of its citizens .. ." ld.
at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302
S.E.2d 868 (1983)). The court also noted that, "[w]e give our Constitution a liberal
interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect to those provisions which were designed
to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizens .... " Id. (citing State v. Harris, 216
N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1939)). See also Martin, supra note 44, at 1751 ("When faced with
an opportunity to provide its people with increased protection through expansive
construction of state constitutional liberties, a state court should seize the chance ....
During the past decade, North Carolina has been at the head of the movement to energize
state constitutional law.").
102. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
103. Id. at 764-65, 6 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting 11 AM. JUR. 670).
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Guaranteeing the absolute right to jury factfinding on the conviction
elements and sentencing factors more liberally construes the
protection of citizens provided in Article I, Section 24 than the
Denning rule, 1" which limits the scope of the right to the essential
elements. 15 Thus, neither a reversal of the prohibition on waivers nor
a rejection of Blakely's expansion of the scope of a jury trial would
square with North Carolina's constitutional tradition.
Admittedly, this precedent and canon of construction do not
inform the issue of waivers as clearly as they inform the expansion of
the scope of jury trials because the option to have a judge hear
sentencing factors may favor defendants. 6
However, strong
language in other state cases supports the continued prohibition of
waivers of the right to a trial by jury. In State v. Moss,"°7 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that the defendant could not be tried
and convicted by an officer in the police department, even where he
"acquiesced" to such jurisdiction because the right to a jury trial was
"absolute and unconditional."1 8 Likewise, in State v. Stewart, °9 the
state's high court found the defendant's waiver of the right to a jury
trial to be "in violation of the constitution, and in subversion of a
fundamental principle of the common law.' ' 10
Because the
prohibition of waivers in North Carolina reflects the state's
interpretation of the fundamental principles of individual rights under
its own constitution, state courts must not replicate the United States
Supreme Court's allowance for waivers of the right to a jury at any
phase of state criminal trials.
In conclusion, although allowing defendants to waive their right
to a jury trial may seem to be an attractive procedural solution to the
challenges of Blakely for structured sentencing, courts should not

104. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
105. See State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 454, 412 S.E.2d 31, 36 (1992).
106. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968), the Supreme Court observed
that, while the intent of the provision for jury trials in all non-petty criminal cases was to
counter unfairness of judge trials, in some criminal cases the defendant will be treated as
fairly by a judge as by a jury. Thus, the Court found no Sixth Amendment problem with
allowing a defendant to waive the right to a jury in a misdemeanor case carrying a twoyear punishment. Likewise, in Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942), the Court
noted that "since trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be
permitted to forego its privileges when his competent judgment counsels him that his
interests are safer in the keeping of the judge than of the jury."
107. 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 64 (1854).
108. Id. at 67 (invalidating the judgment of the local Intendant of Police and allowing
the county prosecutors to proceed with a proper subsequent trial).
109. 89 N.C. 563 (1883).
110. Id. at 564.
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narrow the scope of jury trials from Blakely's expansive guarantee. A
narrow individual right would violate the state drafters' intent to
protect the role of juries. At the same time, important differences
exist between the language and intent of the state and federal
constitutions that should dissuade courts from reversing the North
Carolina precedent prohibiting waivers of the Article I, Section 24
right to a jury trial simply because the United States Supreme Court
has accepted waivers of the Sixth Amendment. The solution to the
North Carolina's Blakely dilemma must be to pass the Commission's
Draft Legislation providing for jury trials on aggravating facts and to
apply this procedure in every case where a defendant contests the
existence of aggravating circumstances. The General Assembly has
enacted a sentencing framework that will uphold the state's
constitutional intent to protect individual rights and the United States
Supreme Court's new interpretation of the right to a jury trial by
requiring juries to determine the existence of all aggravating factors
before judges can impose aggravated sentences. Despite the Blakely
Act's silence on the question of waivers, the requirement for jury
trials must be read to prohibit waivers of the right to a jury trial on
the existence of any contested aggravating factors. The North
Carolina General Assembly's willingness to reinvigorate the role of
the jury deserves recognition for upholding the state's constitutional
traditions and the state's precedent of protecting the rights of criminal
defendants.
MARGARET
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